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1 
INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATION SUPPORT IN  GROUP DSS 
ABSTRACT. Negotiation support is an irrtportant aspect of rr~ultipersort decisiort support 
systems. Besides rnecliarlisnis for representing and evolvirtg group joint problern representatio~ts, such 
DSS should also provide an environment in which decision rrtakers are supported in developing, 
analyzing and reinforcing their individual negotiation position. Recognizing the diversity of research 
approaches to negotiation niodelling in the literature, this paper syrtthesizes an integrated model 
from which a knowledge-based ii~dividual negotiatio~t support enviroilrrtent using tools from different 
areas can be designed. Role and arcltitecture of such a contponent are described in the context of 
MEDIATOR, a database-centered negotiatiorl support system under development at NYU. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
111 an increasiilgly cornplex a1ic1 turbulent husirless envirorrment, decisio~t makers will have to rely 
more and more on aclvances in i r i fo rn~a t io r~~co~nmur t i ca t io~~  technology for support [Huber and 
McDaniel, 1986;. Wlrile traditiortnl single-user decision support systems (DSS) help explicate 
individual decision rnakers' problem views. thus tniproving rnanagerial corrirr~unication 'Sanders et al., 
19841, moder11 office communication technology [Tsichritzis, 19851 can serve as a vehicle to support 
rnultiperson decisions more directly. 
A number of researchers have begun to study the design and potential impact of so-called Group 
DSS [Gray 1981, Huber 1982, Turoff and Hiltz 1982. Bui and Jarke 1984, DeSanctis and Gallupe 
1985, Goncalves, 198ijj. Knowledge sharing and negotiation support in different time/space 
organizational settings have emerged as critical goals of such systems [Jarke, 19861. While knowledge 
sharing refers to the cooperative aspects of GDSS, negotiation support is needed where there is a 
conflict, of interests. 
The MEDIATOR project at New York University attempts to  integrate both of these aspects into 
a comprelrertsive DSS architecture for niultiperson decision making that is not necessarily cooperative. 
4 C O I ~ ~ ~ O I I  irattc fs?rr~rwnrk for. krlnwledge sharing and negotiation protocols is acflieveit by a 
e i t  - I r e  J i i k * ,  i,t 1! IQPc, Process aspects of ntultiperson decision rr1'1k111g 
! I ?  I 1 1 i i  i t '  1TIlPi5 l f i  1 J \ O !  t * ~ O i  i l x  - t - t t * s i l -  ( i + . i ~ ~ i  >!lak!ll; 1 ) X I  \ t k - r ~ \ \  r<>R * - 
t>90 k111d. 1 8 1  11t24,t I ~ I ( ~ I I  * * ~ [ ) : l * n i *  i lpl>iit 1 1 1 -  211,ii;) ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ > C l a t l ( , t ~  - ~ t [ ) f ) d > i t  t ~ f  ~ i ~ t e ~ : ' t t i ~ i ~  111 111 I ~ I I ~  > i  
poz~tio~i+ 1111 ! . i c * i ~ i ~  ~ I + L I > I < J ~ :  1 . t  1 I ~ I C ~ I L I , ~  7 ;  i ~ i ~ t ~ t j i l  - , t  ig>t e 3 ,  l l  1, i r i \  ? t >  l y f e ~ t  I I F -  
~ ~ O ~ i t l I ~ I l  - ]!+> t ! izi?I 11 L. t i1a 1 1 :  i l i i  Ill [>< -+  I 1 %  lilt?\ 1 1 ~ ~  t % ~1:IIi~ 911 l-vl I u-eilc'Ltl, ,[, !l 1 h e  k>Lt>!,, 
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and then evolvirig this representatiori through consensus-seeking (via problerrl redefinition) and 
compromise (v ia  concession making) towards a jointly acceptable agreement. Since con~munication is 
tlle main goal. a relatively simple niutually unclerstandable language rrlust be used for the joint 
problem represerrtation. 
In contrast, an individual negotiation support cornponent has to provide a rich set of tools for 
analyzing the decision makers' perceptions of their own as well as their opponents' bargairling 
position. This requires an uriderstanding of the rnechariics and dynarnics of the  cognitive aspects of 
tlle negotiation process. Each of the many research areas tha t  have contributed to our understariding 
of negotiations has  modeled this problem in its own idiosyncratic way. Unfortunately, none of the  
approaches represents the full richness of negotiation processes and outcomes. This paper is an  
attempt to  integrate major contributions of several disciplines into a unified model of negotiations 
that  in turn serves ns the b a s ~ s  for the design of a k~~nwleclqe-based ~rliftvld~lal negotiation support 
enviro~iment within tlle MEDIATOR architecture. While we cannot claim to have developed a 
comprehensive t h e o r y  of rlegotintions, w e  a t  least expect to  provide a. rrloclel for 3 uniform s y s t e m s  
enczronrnent In which tools from different areas can be applied Future work wtll have to show to  
what degree ge~iera l  theories can be developed fro111 the integrated ~tlodel. 
This paper is orgarlized as follows. Section 2 reviews the contributiotls of six reference disciplines 
with respect to  their potential usefulness in individual negotiation support: game theory, decision- 
making under uncertainty, process analysis, sociology, industrial relations, and psychology. Section 3 
presents the integrated model along with two examples, and provides soine justificatiori by rriapping 
the approaches taken by each area into i t .  Section 4 provides a brief overview of the MEDIATOR 
architecture and describes a knowledge-based design for i t s  individual negotiation support component 
based on the  model. In section 5, relationships to  other CDSS, potential application areas, 
liniitations and future plans are discussed. 
2. APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATIONS 
Negotiations are a part of everyday life. Whenever there is disagreement or  conflict of interest 
between two or more parties, they negotiate However, rlegotiat~ons vary s ~ ~ b s t a n t l a l l y  in thew 
frtnclai-nerltai cilnrartert~ttcs llke the ~~rrrierlv~riy Ittcttlvnt~on, the nature of the r e [n t~o t t s l l~~)  between 
8 ,  . . 
111,l v. 11  hi!^ i t i t ,  ; I . L I - ~  1 ~ s .  he specific fe~t t~i res  of' the issue tmcLer 11eyociac1~111. :I:!~.I 1~egt2t i i ~ t ~ o u  
ijr~cwAit;t:lf (see Kaii'i'n. 1982j for a detnileil a r ~ a l ~ s i s f .  
Tl!rcli.it:? it., r ~ p l ; l i ~ i  tire rieqociacion process have been proposed by researchers frsrn iiifferrr~r 
Llisciplirie-. i r i , i i i . i i i i . :  ( ; . ~r t i r  Tiirory (bc~ryniri ir~q),  Ecc,rlorrlics jiiecisioi~ rrlaki~l< iiiiilei- iiz~cel.rniilryj. 
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Process Analysis (joint decision-making process), Sociology, Industrial Relations (collective 
bargaining), Politics (international negotiations. terrorism, etc.) and,  Psychology (behavioral styles 
and negotiation strategies, etc.). It is the purpose of this section to summarize major contributions 
of these areas a s  far as they appear to be related to the goal of designing a negotiation support, 
system. In doing so, we shall cornpare the approaches on their: focus of attention - what parts  of 
the negotiation process they seek to  describe, level of analyszs or detail, realzsm or extent of 
simplifying and limitirig assumptions, and determznancy or prescriptive power. 
2.1. Game Theory - Bargaining 
Game theory a t tempts  to model negotiation behavior as a rational-choice, self-interested behavior 
toward a given array of values. It is primarily geared toward analyzing the decision " t o  negotiate or  
not to". 
Elementary game theory assumes two parties, or organized collectivities, rnaking choices froni 
among a set of alternatives to reach an agree~nent.  The set of all alterriative courses of action ope11 
to  both "bargainers", the relation between each possible pair of actions chosen arid the bargallling 
outcomes, and the  utilities assigned to these ontcornes, are assurried to be known to  both bargainers. 
The  pattern of demands and concessions was shown to  lead to  a n  agreement which maximizes the  
product of the utilities of the  two bargainers [Sash,  1950, 1953; Zeuthen. 19301. 
Harsanyi (1956) suggested the  concept of "maximum risk of no agreement" to  explain the process 
by which the Nash outcomes were reached. This introduced corlsiderations of uricertairities arlci 
probability into the bargaining process. Harsanyi (1962), extended this method t o  cases where the  
two parties "do not know (and know tha t  they d o  not know) each other's utility function 
(preferences and attitudes towards risk)". This, he suggested, leads to  "compounded expectations" 
which converge by two ~nechanisms: the usage of "stereotype utility functions" and the  process of 
~ n u t u a l  "adj~st111er1t" of expectations as bargaining proceeds. 
The i~nplications of 110 agreement or "stalerriate" on the bargaining process were st,udied by 
Sclielling (1963) and later on by a. host of ot,lier.s. Scltelliiig poiriteil ou t  that  t h e  tittle required to  
reach an  agreerilent was  costly to  hot!^) bargainers ,~li;i that  this cost  was :lil iriipt)i.tctllt factor in 
( l e t e r ~ ~ i i i i i ~ i ~  t h t >  f i ~ i i ~ I  lli.!i - 1 ,  ! l 6 h 3 . I )  i ~ ~ i t , ~ < \ t , "  i '.,]isl,j~i!it i i : , . - ' .  I . . .  :li8*,.J.,.i . s , ~ ~ t : ~ p . i c . ~ ~  
* .  
rnakirlg behavior and sil i i -cr-rr~i r11  I F  t h ~ .  ~ t . i i . ~ - i ! ~ ~ ( ~ r  w i t h  iiie loss-rr-  ,!i~c:,li!?r r.:iit. has  r l i i ,  bnrqniriirlg 
<ldvnntage.  C'ross (l!liiO) cievcl(~p+.~.i  1 , ie t , i i i r~ i i  rlirg~rl fail. the i11ip1ic;~ririi:- (of chis '"tiiiie cost" oli 
k)arqaiiiiriq. He suggested chat t-<~ch !~.?i,,:,~iii+~r f .!1(3 ' , - t~z * I ~ I I I ~ ~ I ~ ~ !  [ h i t  1ti-1xita1iZcs 1 i,e>eiit v ~ ~ i i t ~ ,  
~ i i s c u r i ~ ~ t e d  according to rile liriie i r  wi)cii:l  ?,:kt. r t \  2t.t i t .  . " t t h r . y  i!i!;x.,i! i i : r  ~ I I L ~ I ~ I ~ ~ I L ~ ~ ( > ~ L  ,of t h i s  ~ ~ r k  
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was the concept of disproportional effects of the bargaining process on the two bargainers because of 
subjective estimates and asymmetric information. 
After Harsanyi (19621, Cross was the first to revitalize the concept of "learningn in the game by  
suggesting that  the  bargainers perceptions of their own time costs --and expectations about their 
opponent's-- evolves in response to bargaining behavior and its corlsequences. Bargaining can be 
visualized as the  process of reducing and eliminating the  gap between the final outcornes estimated 
by the two participants on the basis of their perceptions of their relative bargaining strengths. 
Harsanyi (1967-68) tackles the problem of uncertainty about the pay-offs for the opponent by 
proposing that  each bargainer actually imagines tha t  he is faced by a probability distribution of 
different types of bargainers --each with characteristic pay-offs-- and bases his strategy on the 
expected value. He also uses estimates of his opponent's expectations about him. In [Harsanyi, 1972, 
1976; flarsanyi artd Selteit 1972'. n two-persorr bargainiiig game wltti ~rtcorriplete irlforrrlatio~l is 
reinterpreted as an  11-person Bayesian game. Selterl (1975) notes: " the  dynarllics of the bargaining 
process appear t o  be a vefiicle for credible exchange of information". Li~iliting a s s ~ ~ r l p t i o n s  that  each 
of these theories makes are discussed in :Crawford. 1085]. 
Research on non-cooperative garries and dynamic game theory takes a slightly different approach. 
Rao and Sllakun (1974) model concession-making as a sequential decision problem and develop a 
dynamic programming model to  solve it. Going one step further, Shakun (1981) nlodels conflict as a 
problem with initially no feasible solution. Redefinition of the probleni is required for a feasible 
solution to emerge. Shakun develops a "goals,/values referral process" as a possible rriodel to  describe 
how the system is redefined in search of a solution. 
Game theory views negotiations as strategic exercises and is perliaps the only area tha t  has 
attempted to  address all aspects of a negotiation. It is, however, handicapped in i t s  a t tempts  t o  
model the negotiation process because i t  deals with a scenario where the values or  preferences are 
fixed and so outconles are inherent in the very structure of the game. The process of charlge in the  
values is something that  game theory does not capture. 
3.2. Economics - Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
. . T-ilcertnillt?; ,I :ieqoii,~cio~l pro( i 3 s f i ; l ~ i  ~ ~ . i s t h  fro111 r7,v,> s*~i~r( - (>s :  ! i \ l t ~ i c e ~ . :  , l j j l l : i  ,t I : <  I lie 
~;lltcoxries, state; of  itntilre also cnliecl "risk" rrr:I ( 2 )  li~~cert 'nirity nboilt rile ~ppi~ i ! t? i~r ' ;  preferrrrces. 
.-~n;tlysia (if decision-111nkiq urtcier "risk" i ~ n s  heert ilorriiilatrii br- i i i r  ,iui>rcLrrl a i t l i t j ;  rireorv. It is 
widely n r c e p r ~ d  ns n near nor~nat~ive rnodzl i j f  rntivrlal choice i r l t i  ,I ~ ; \ i . r i ; . i ~ i~ i . i v  ; <,oci i i e t e r ~ ~ ~ i i i n ~ ~ r  ..f 
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economic behavior. iArrow, 1971; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Savage, 19541. The assessment of 
alternatives under the expected utility theory is based on: the expected utility of the 
outcomes/consequences of the alternative, "asset integration" which refers to whether or not the 
utility resulting from the choice increases the total "wealth" of the decision rnaker and, "risk 
aversion" or the preference for certain returns compared to uricertairl ones. The  utilities of outcornes 
are weighted in the ratio of their probabilities. If two outconies have the same utility, then the one 
with greater probability was always preferred. 
The expected utility model is basically a "constant utility7' model; it assurnes that each outcome 
has a time-invariant utility value [Luce, 19591. In the "random utility" model, the utilities are 
described as random variables [Coornbs. 19581 and this assumption is often used to explain the 
77 intransitivity of alternatives" and charlging utilities for outcomes. Coombs, et. al. (1970) have 
sought to evpla~ri tlie cogilltivr proce-eei brl~tn(l srtcli n plienotrieno~~ They corlclucte that different 
decision rules are used urider d~ffererlt situations by tile same decision rriaker arid propose a 
contingency approach to choice theory, rtsiriq cognitive factors, particularly i~lfornxatio~i processing 
variables, to determine the "how rrittch" nricl "how" of information storage and retrieval, how a 
decision problem is for~nulateci and consequently, how it is solved. 
Simon's (1947) theory of bounded ratioilality shows that hurriari beings use "decisiori heuristics" in 
their decision making to reduce the illformation processing overhead. These decision heuristics are 
entirely subjective and as a result tend to be biased. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have shown 
experimentally that expected utility theory is systematically violated. They identify a "certainty 
effect" -people prefer certainty, a "reflection effect" -people are risk averse in choices involving sure 
gains but risk seeking in choices involving sure losses (this phenomenon is often referred to  as the 
problem of "framingn), and an "isolation effect" - people disregard compoiie~its that alternatives 
share, arid focus on components that distinguish them. The isolation effect explains how inconsistent 
preferences and intransitive preferences could happen. 111 their Prospect Theory, Kahneman arid 
Tversky propose that people evaluate the desirability of an alternative not by the new total state 
that results from tlie clioice but by the net gains or losses in choosing that alternative. This value 
hinction. i s  cqncave for qairls and convex for losses with a steeper slope. Yet another decision 
iieuristlc chat 13 otteri used la tile c~vailablllty" of relevarlt informat~on. This refers to the vivid~iess 
w t t ! ~  v.!iith ~ t .  i j L t {  ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ i i  iz - 1 t 8 1 ~ 8 i  \ , - ~ I ( I  ~ i ~ k t ) l ! ~ ~ ~ l I i t ) l i  I >  111ore ie<achl> "av~ilablel '  <~~ic l  30 te11c1s to 
Li'x- deci21t 11 111 ihi112 \ ~ > t w ( -  I I ~ ~ I  Ro-, ( It, 1 ;  i i i i  L I I L ~ > I ~ I S O I I -  fee<lljctck 3111 the lie-yotiaiioii I I < ~ =  
lii ilie i o i i ~ r ~ i i ~ i t i - a i i  i t  i?iair - r ? ~ h  I ~ i ' i i ~ i z t i l -  r h t i e  L I P  l ~ i l i ~ k  J I  1Iie:e l l t11i1>~1~> that , o i ~ t ~  i t l i < t  riie 
r~prcteci iirll~c-, E I I ~ ~ I I I I I Z ~ ~ I % ) I I  ~ I I V I U %  I I ! ~  I [ -  h'i-il t e i ~ t ~ t -  
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Notwithsta~iding the effects of cognitive limitations, decision and judgemental biases, expected 
utility theory is  still the  major normative theory of decision making. However, the -use of the 
"utility maximizing" concept is tempered by corrlbining it with the "satisficing" concept proposed 
first by March a n d  Simon (1958) (see also 'Raiffa, 19821 and /Tietz, 19831). Another rnajor theory 
that  needs to be mentioned is the "equity" theory 'Adarns. 19651 which emphasizes people's desire to  
achieve fair ou tco~nes  as a result of i ts  easier acceptability [Sclielling, 19631, and the ability to 
maintain goodwill in recurrent relationships [Morgan and Sawyer, 19671. This theory has since been 
extended by Walster, et. a1 (1973) to  incorporate a "mixed-motive" flavor into it - t o  maximize own 
gain as well as divide oritcomes equitably. 
In summary, this  approach has focused on the decision-making process in a negotiation. Its 
normative models for111 the backbone of most present-day scientific business decision-making. The 
clisadvantages of such arr approach are that. though it. is high in it,s i le t r r~i i i r~ar~cy,  the sriilrc.rs of 
such determinaricy are artificial constructs like indifference curves, pareto-optimalit,y etc. Sorile of 
the concepts are in realit'y tinoperationa.liznble or tend to  have poor construct valiclity. Moreover, 
the rationality assumpt,ions ignore as irrstional ninny int,eresting nspect,s of rlegot,iations like 
preference intransitivity, power, persuasion and coercion? etc. 
2.3. Process Analysis - Joint Decision Making 
Based on earlier economic theory, Siege1 and Fouraker (2960) view the  process of negotiation as a 
joint decision making problem involving a combination of concessions arid convergence. Two 
negotiators start  from distinct initial positions tha t  represent the  initial aspirations or  the  positions 
they want the  opponent to  believe they desire. They then inch incrementally toward each other by 
making concessions until they converge to  a common point. Cross (1969) and Bartos (1974) view 
negotiation as a "learning process" in which the parties "react" t o  each other's concessiorl behavior. 
But this theory assumes syn~met ry  of information. "Findings of the concession/couvergerlce approach 
are available to  both parties. So there is no  advice on liow t o  bargain best t ha t  1s not equally 
accessible to the other side" This obvioiisly results in a stalemate. Another problern of this  
approach is that  it has riot overcorne the problems of cletermirlancy ;Coddington, 1973; Tracy,  1975;. 
Concessiori rates cannot be calcrllntr~l e ~ > 1 1 >  drlii ch-111qe oveI tlrrlth Ttiis approncl~ (lor- nut  allc.4~ for 
considerntinr~s 31lclr ns liae of j 1 1 ) ~ l i t ~ t  t t - i i i ( 1  i i t c  i t 1 t j 1 1  - k i H >  ~ i i i c  11 i : i i i f I i ~  t t f - t  t i l l ?  ( C ) I I C P - - ~ O I ~  
I a te  a t  jriy pcmic in tlllie 
A ienletiy t h a t  tias bee11 suggeste'l f.>r t hl: 1; r i,at : ii? iieut l t  iniroli r o i l l c i  he r r , ~ ~ > ~ i t - i  rri ''e<~ciiiilil. 
pr(lres+ ~ri,te,iil ljf leilrillilg process, hilt ihla t i i r t i i ~ ~  + v ! i ~ c .  - tile 1 / 1 ~ 1 , l v  Le)w ~ l c ~ t e ~ t x i i ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ c >  t o t  tile 
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theory. A more fundamental question is whether it reflects the nature of real-world negotiations. 
Often the approach is applicable only when the variables under discussion are quantifiable and 
discretizable. Only  then can distinct initial positions be identified arid incremental coricessioris inade. 
Since only the concession rates are considered to the exclusion of other variables, an illcoherent 
mosaic of piece-by-piece concessions may emerge. Another very inlportarit aspect of riegotiatioris 
ignored in this approach is tha t  frequently the list of itenis under negotiation is in itself a mat ter  of 
negotiation. 
As an  answer to  the drawbacks of the concession/cortvergence approach, Zartmari [I9771 presents a 
formula/detail approach: negotiations proceed by finding the  proper "formula" before implementing 
"detail". According to  Zartman, "negotiators begin by groping around for a jointly agreeable formula 
that  will serve a s  a referent, provide a notion of justice, and define a conirlion perception on which 
i~nplementation cletails c an h~ based: power rnakes the  values fit together 1x1 the package and tiirlirlg 
is important t o  rrlaki~lg the forrriula stlck". His erriphasis is on the process of ~iegotiatiori as a 
process of "searching" - first for a sirrqle formula (similar to Shakun's (1981) goa l s /v~ lue  referral 
process) and then for the  implemeritatlori of this fo r~nu la  through the  specification of details. He 
claims that  while the concession/converge~ice approach is by nature "reactive" and passive, tlie 
formula/detail approach is associated with an "active search for a solution" and thus enhances the  
probability of creative solutions. It also leads to  greater satisfaction than concession-making 
approaches since concessio~is tend to be viewed as losses. This approach allows for the i~lciusion of 
power as added value in the  process of selecting arid modifying values. The  concession/convergence 
approach can be thought of as the process of negotiation of detail after a formula has been found. 
Unfortunately, this approach suffers froni a total  lack of determinancy. 
In the "progressive constri~ction" approach <Wall, 19751, the  issues under discussion are decided 
upon only one issue at  a time. This can be coriceptualized as a group decision making situation on  
a complex topic t h a t  i s  5pread out over time, like clisarrnarrient. 
The analysis of negotiations as joint decision trinkirig processes focuses at tention an  a macro-level 
observation of clie process and its dynanilcs - tlie "how" of negotiations. As 1s to  be expected 111 
such an  analysis. the urlilerlylrlg ~r lechan~cs  of l r id~vidt~nl  valrle*, preferetlce- arid ~ r l - , t i~n t io~ l -  - t!rt 
"\i\ hy" - 1s igr~itrecl Tfit a(lvnrrt3sr o f  -1rc11 t r l  1[)p[i3 i t  1 1  I- t 1 1  i t  I -1% 6 -  11- 1% 1 a i i \  i t  
1 1 t 1 t l 1  1 1 I I 1 1  p i e  - 1 1 l 1 1 1 t  1 I !  I 1 1 t r ! I L L -  lj i 1,- 
up ciie poaslb~l~tv t a p i ) i \ ~ ~ i q  2ea1cll ~ecli~uqi:es [IeveIopeJ f t b  11- I* - 1 1 4  1, t -  11 ~ I ~ I C I  t1 l n r -  i I i s ~ x i <  , r l t  
,~n-i l \ze and pos-  hi ti -ilpp(irr I neqntlaiion 
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2.4. Sociology 
In a sociological scenario, negotiations are seen as involving dual, conflicting motivations: t h e  
individual's (competitive) desire to  maximize his own utility arid the collectivistic (cooperative) desire 
to  reach a "fair" solution. Literature in anthropology emphasizes the significance of "reciprocity". 
Reciprocal exchanges create bonds of friendship tha t  hold society together. Hornans' (1961) rule of 
distributive justice says that  men view as fair, rewards tha t  are proportional t o  the receipent's 
contribution to society. This norm of fairness can be seen as a state of equilibrium. Any devia t io~i  
generates forces tha t  at tempt to restore it - t ha t  is why it became a norm in the first place. 111 
addition, society institutionalizes and imposes sanctions on deviants. 
In agreeing t o  reach a "fair" solution through the equal distribution (not division) of the  
maximum pay-off tha t  each side can rationally expect, this approach does not allow for strategic 
misrepresentations or "bluffing". It is in the interests of each negotiator to  rriake hie opening hid as 
close to giving zero pay-off to  h ~ s  opponent as possible. Tliis way, each negotiator cart through tile 
initial tentative acceptance form nn idea as to  his opponents position aricl what he can rationally 
expect froni the negot~ation.  
Once the initial tentative offers have been accepted very reluctantly, the size of the  opening 
concession gains importance. This is invariably a function of sorile factors extraneous to the  
negotiation process itself - psychological or sociai. A rational bargainer in this approach will expect 
a reciprocation of his offer. The rule of thumb that  can be used to  judge whether a particular 
concession has been reciprocated equally is seen as the s ta te  such tha t  the negotiators have no need 
to  revise their original expectations about the ultimate agreement. This implies tha t  the  fair~iess in 
is only "perceived fairnessn. Failure to  niatch concessions is not seen as "unfair7' if t he  
negotiator perceives tha t  his opponents preferences have changed. Response to  unfairness comes either 
as withdrawal or  in the form of behavior tha t  maintains the negotiators expectation about t h e  
outcome. Unexpectedly large concessions lead to revision of opponents expectatiorls arid unexpectedly 
small ones bring sanctions or stop further opponent concessions. Negotiators must be skillful enough 
to spot fair cor~cessions and discriminate unfair ones. 
The itotiori of tire clesire to achieve fairness ns bein.: t h e  clriviug force irl a r~eqot~inriot~ itas sorile 
. . !iiiiii.iiioii- 1: 1 -  i s . i - ~ ' i i  8011 n decision heiirietii: r!i;tt i; 1;ry v ; : i ie .  <i ; i i l  i l ! - . l e . f j~ l i~ i !  -- r l i i .  ,.lpi:ct:ijt . ~ f  
- r  i a ~ r r r e ~ s  ' - kiy i r -  i.c.i.-i. rinrnre. sllclr an approach !a(-ks ~ler+~i.riiiiiiiric~- :liirl is tipeii t ( i  iilji!tit~~cte of 
interpretatio:?s. i-lq.fis-~+i-. th s approach reveals tile lillportnltce of sccietn! norrrlr, qroirp iii,rrlts. and 
ethic:: as I:lcror- . d  irit+.rest i r i  stuciyirlg rregotintio~~,;. 
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2.5. Industrial Relations - Collective Bargaining 
Labor riegotiat.ions car1 be described as "the deliberate iriteraction of two or more coniplex social 
units which are attempting to redefine the terms of their interdepende~lce" [Walton and McKersie, 
19751. 
Three major propositions underly the explanation of conflict in this approach: (1) differences in 
goals, interests or  values of the two parties [March and Simon, 1958; Axelrod, 1970, Pondy, 1969; 
Deutsch, 1971; Cormick, 19711, (2) interdependence among the parties [Walton and McKersie, 1965; 
Walton et al., 1969], and (3) perceived opportunity for interference [Mack arid Snyder, 1957; 
Goldman, 1962; Pondy, 19671. 
Perrow 119611 describes operative goals in an organization as being "those that are erribecided in 
the rnajor operatrrig policies arid daily decisions of the personnel". They could reter GO both means 
and ends. 111 general, greater iricorripatibility in goals leads to greater conflict. Dispersion or 
distribution of power among the bargaining parties was also important in deternlinirlg the extent of 
co11flict [Cormick, 1971; Dubrrl, 1960; Darkenwalcl, 1971j. In general, the more eveilly clistributed the 
power, the greater the conflict. Coritrol structure as orie determinant of official power also infli~ences 
the occurence of conflict. Arribiguity about jurisdiction, i.e., differences in perception of authority 
relationships also affects conflict forrrlation iWalton et. al., 19691. Deutsch (1973), i11 a socio- 
psychological approach to understanding negotiations, identifies six major sets of variables that affect 
negotiation behavior: characteristics of the conflicting parties, prior relationships between/among 
corlflicting parties (the first tinie a concept of "history" has bee11 introduced), nature of issue giving 
rise to conflict, social environment within which conflict occurs, strategies and tactics employed by 
the conflicting parties and, the consequences of conflict to each of the participants. 
Kochan et al. (1975) suggest that the most effective strategy for resolving conflict lies in 
recognizing the uncterlying goals that the parties are seeking in the process ailcl acceptirig the 
legitimacy of their efforts to pursue their goals. 
The Iriciitstrial Reiarioiis approactr recogrlizes the fact that coriflict is dyrianiic as rrlanifest in the 
ronetnntl> ctinnginq i1ntw-e of t t t ~  ?on is  hnt  does not -ittempt to understnild the actual rrreclin~iisrrle 
t I I . * - I i t -  i n - -  t i t *  + i t i ~ , i :  ~ i k  i i ~ i i ~ i r ~ ~ i ~ ~ n i  * i f fe l (~ i~c~+ rrr risk-tak111g pror?t,~i,-rt\ 
r~iot~vntlort I r 211 1 t l i r i i  I ii slue- Iiflwr\ er pi tivliit. n t l  approach n l~er t  r !I* 
P X I - ~ ~ I L C ~  l j f  p o ~ t  t ~ ~ - ( l ~ p e ~ u i t  r t  \ i ?I I [  ioii:Ii~p- I -  t<-,: 111aiIx ~ c k r i n ~ - ~ \  Ie !cw 1 i- tri L~ript > I  t a ~ i t  (letei 111Lxt~irlr ,f 
I l e ~ l l t l < l ~  ll)rl *11t< ~ ~ 1 1 1 " .  
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2.6. Psychology 
People, as participants in a negotiation, conlmuriicate positions, send s i g ~ ~ a l s  by making clerna~ids 
and concessions, respond to  sigrials from the opponent, arid through a sequence of such exchanges 
arrive at  a solutiori to the problem under negotiation. Negotiation, in this approach. can be defined 
as a process of value arid behavior n~odification through exchange of con~n~unicatioris .  
Spector (1977), identifies four primary factors tha t  affect the negotiatiori process from the 
"microlevel perspective" of negotiator psychology: (I) the  individual personality needs of the  
negotiator; (2) the  personality compatibility among negotiators; (3) negotiator perceptio~is of his 
opponents strengths. weaknesses, positions, values, preferences, alternatives and  intentions and his 
expectations of the opponents strategies and actions; and  (4) persuasive mechanisms actually 
enlployed to nindify the bargaiiiirig positions aricl values of the opponent to achieve a r1lnr.r favorable 
(from his point of view) convergence of interests. 
Several researchers have studied links between single psychological factors arid rlegotiation behavior 
[Rubin and Brown, 1975; Spector, 1975; Drucknian, 19733. The results have been rrllxed. The failure 
to  find irltuitively obvious relatio~iships has been explained as being the result of poor 
operationalization of the psychological constructs. However, a significant amount of research and case 
studies have shown that  negotiator "perso~lality" as rriariifested in predispositions towards the 
opponent and his nlotives for actions are important determinants of negotiation behavior [deFellice, 
19761. Similarly, perceptions of the  opponents' strengths, weaknesses, intentions, commitments and 
goals affect the negotiator's response, the tone of interpersonal communication, and che learning 
process. Mutual power and influence relationships, employed effectively arid credibly, provoke changes 
in negotiator values/perceptions and can lead to  eventual concessions and convergence t o  an  
agreement jzartrnan, 19741. Finally, the interaction between the personalities of the  two bargainers 
(soft against hard, etc.). and the interaction between the bargaining context and personality factors 
(certain characteristics are triggered by certain situatloris) decide the bargaining style of the  
negotiator, according to this approach. 
Trying to understx-nd the psyci~oiogical aspects of riegotiacion gives a. feel for i t s  rnicro-level 
elernertts: the tlilderlyir~g fact>ors nr~rl rt~otiv;triori_. i i ~ i i r  tirive ;I ireqoti;itiorl. If we cari look heyorici 
~iinirift>sred ~legiji i;ii iuil i?rirnvior t i  i t ;  , 'i-!cii;- i i f  i i:r f.icti.;. .ii..ri!ic t!!. t i i - ,  
rregociatiorl's ohjecrive of value (:htl~~lji s 1 1 . 1 i f  :~cIri~vt-tI, T i l e  pr13i-~itil is xr-it i i  rile p . ;~ ,c - i l~~i i ,g )  ,>ppr t .~~i(  !l 
are its obvious lack of determinancy nrld t f i t ,  . i i ~ l i ~ ~ s i  ii) ) i r l t  r i c , ~ r e  ,~!l<-i iivtiivi.ti iiiter-i.~.Iar ii?ii~iiips 
. . 
a t i e  i r e  r i a b e .  Its t t l  i i f  . i t  I - 1 a - 1 I I i i i ~  
~ieqotinting parties. ,IIL$.! their ability to  11lc1(.1ify 0 1 t a  . V : I ~ I I P ?  , f  t i a , ,  ~ . . - ~ t t ~ .  , i [  .-raike, I t  ~ioe.. i : < > c  It.,)! 
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extensively with the negotiation process itself. Moreover, as yet, there is no single unified theory 
which combines all the single-trait research into a nieariingful overall psychological theory of 
negotiations. 
3. A UNIFIED MODEL 
We have seen how the negotiation process has been studied and explained by researchers in 
different fields. They vary in perspective and in focus, in the level of analysis, the level of detail, in 
their assumptions and in their objectives. 111 short, tlie approaches preser~t different "windows" to 
understanding negotiations, even though a few of these approaches address a number of aspects of 
negotiation (e.g., game theory or the model by Deutscti (1973)). 
In contrast. a negotiation support system neecls a more wholistic approach that integrates the 
different perspectives into a uniforirl model that enables us to design a DSS to support the 
negotiatiori process. While this may riot be feasible in the short run, the model to be coristructed in 
this section should at least be sufficient to serve as tlie foundation of a riegotiatiotl support 
environment in which a decision niaker can embed existing and forthcoming tools from any of the 
different areas. Inasnluch as these approaches seek to  describe the salrie phenotrlertori, it appears 
possible and indeed desirable to integrate them, relaxing their assumptions and entrancing their 
descriptive power, in a joint framework that captures all major dimensions of the riegotiatioii 
process. 
3.1. The Model 
As a starting point, we propose a two-person model of negotiatio~is as shown in Figure 1. 
(Extension to other cases will be briefly discussed at  the end of this section.) The rriodel clairns 
that for describing or prescribing a negotiation we need information about: the environment, 
negotiator needs ant1 values, perceptions and euprctatioiis, available experience. t he  ctecisio~~-rnaking 
process(es) that are used, the manifested bargaining behavior and the evoivlng state-of-the-problem as 
the negotiation progressel.. These corripoiieiits Influence and change each other clynamically, as 
~ridicated by the arrows 111 the f igu~e  S ~ I A L ~  i t  preserlt ~ n a n y  of the5e r e l a c i o ~ ~ ~ i i t p ~  lack eliipirlcai 
vallilatiori as to their directiori aricl stiettqtl~ rht. follo\+irig i l l s c i ~ ~ ~ ~ i i i l  f o c i l ~ - .  ri~nirrll\. i i r i  f i le 
~0illp01leitt;; It 1s Q l l l  ' ! L l n l  t i k i t  r f l ~ - f '  1 I I -  I 1 , k i ~ ~ ' i *  -TrLl~tlile i < , I  i 
r~eqotint~oii 3itpport i.ii\~ronrnerit 2 I 1 I I r ~t rile I I I I P I I ( F I O I L  between tlie 
C U I I I ~ ~ > I ~ ~ I I ~ Z ,  the t l e c ~ s i c ~ i ~  rtlaker I I I I I ~ C  tppI\ j~iiiqriltei~t j i i c i  l i l r l l i t r (9 i i  w !i+:i tiziilq the  ~0015  pi o~ iiieci 
131 t h e  .> .trill 
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FIGURE 1 .  A UNIFIED MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATIONS 
* Environment: This refers to  the state of the world, i.e. the aggregation of technological, 
economic, political and social factors of the environnlent in which the negotiations is set. 
* Experience: This refers to the accuniulated and possibly aggregated store (in the 
negotiators memory- primary storage, or in the memory of those who are accessible to  
the negotiator for consultation- secondary storage) of iriformation about former 
experiences- both general and specific. This can mean tlie history of former experiences, 
the inferences drawn from them (stereotypes), the patterns of strategies used under 
various environmental circumstances, their results, generalizations (decision heuristics), etc. 
* Negotiator Needs and Values: These sten1 from three sources: 
I. The systernzc n e e d s / v a l u e s  refer to  the specific manifestations of characteristic 
motivations and preferences imposed on the negotiator by the "system" in which he 
exists. For instance, the legal system enjoins in i ts  nienlbers a need for fairriess and 
a respect for authority- the law. 
2. Tlie group nc t i l -  u(-tlue;: refer to the needs arld values tha t  a negot~ator  iriiler~ts by 
virtue of his being a rrlenlber of certain groups. These groups niight be the actual  
constituerlts he is represeriting in the negotiation or they might be the subconscious 
affiliations of the negotiator. 111 the former case, tlie rleedsivalues are consciously 
imposed ti poi^ the negotiator in the context of the  r~egotiation. In the lat ter  case. 
they act as subconscious referrents for the rlegotiator. Which of these actually 
surfaces or dominates 1s a furictiorl of the  negotiation context a t  any particular 
point in time. For example, a union representative has a conscious affiliation and  
allegiance to the needs/values of the labor he represents, but  also show subcoriscious 
affiliation to  groups like sex, countrymen etc., and de~rloristrates needs/values tha t  
are representative of them. 
3. The zndzvzdoal  personalz ty  refers t o  the individuals own needs, motivations. and  
preferences, such as need for social approval, need for cooperation and friendship, 
need for achievement, needs for play, seduction, exhibitionism and so on as well as 
his preferences among these needs and the  values lie attaches to  them. 
Which of these three catagories of needslvalues dominates or  which combinatior~ manifests 
itself is also influenced by the  environment (both physical and psychological), and by the  
negotiation and previous experience. Note tha t  both of these change over time as the  
negotiation progresses. 
* Perceptions and Expectations: This represents the  negotiators " problenl 
representation7'. It constitutes the "psychological" aspect of the  environment for each 
individual negotiator where he visualizes positions or  "states-of-the-world"? the  
objectives/goals, the issues under consideration. the alternatives available, at t i tudes 
towards those a1tern;~tives. corrst~rai~lts t,owards rr~akirig cl~oices aniortg al ter~iatives,  
 its iiiteirrle~i ~ c t i o r ; - .  c ~ ~ r d  tile possible ~ t r a t ~ e g y  to l>r uaeil. f ie  iloes this 
evniiintior~ for liirrlself niic-i ;ti;ii ~ i iakrs  ;I silbjecrive rsriirln:r, for.  itis ,?pp(_iiierita. Ttie 
pr-ol~lenl represeritntion rir!iierg~.~ri ( : ~ i ! i i : ~ i i t  i t loc l i f i~nt io~~ n~!i l  cha r~q~ ; .  It ( : ; ~ r i  be rrloclifieci by 
clranges in t,he physical e i i ~ : r . o r ~ n i r ~ i ~ .  cllarlqes III t i e  s r n t r - ~ , f - t i ~ r - p r o ' r ~ l e ; ~ l  :ta rlrr 
nespriatiotl progresses. citarlges in rtercls nnci values occaeioricii a.i~~e t c i  various fnctoi.5. 
cl~arlges in experier~ce t h r o ~ ~ a l i  tile sa i inb i l i t y  of new i~rforrrratii~i: 1111 p:~sr pret:rtienrs. n ~ i i  I 
very irllport;~rlcIy, feedback f r n ~ n  tile acriorts nr basqnirting be11:rvior i:,f T ~ I Z  o p p o i l e ~ i t ~ .  *riir 
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perceptio~ls and expectations of one's own position are influenced by arid in turn influence 
those of t h e  opponent's position. 
* Decision-Making Process: This represents the infererlcing part of the model where 
alternative actions are evaluated by the use of decisiori models or judgemental and 
decision heuristics/biases. Examples of these would be the estimation of expected utility, 
aspiration levels, axioms of equity and fairness, mixed-rriotive optimizations etc. The 
outcome of this process is a set of choices among the alternative actions for a given state 
of the physical environment, a given set of experience histories of decision processes and 
inferences, and a given subjective evaluation by the negotiator of his own and his 
opponent's problem representation as moderated by his needs and values at that point in 
time. It is a dynamic process that changes nature continuously as a functiori of these 
other components of the negotiation process. 
* Bargaining Behavior: This represents t,he actual bargaining behavior of the negotiator; 
it includes the making of deniaiids, offers, concessions, threats, promises, strategic 
posturing through suppression, distortion or tnisrepresentation O F  information, deception 
and bluffing, tfie use o f  power arid 111f11lertce >rrategres etc This process is infltterlced by 
the manifest needs and values of the negotiator, his percepcivns of his and the opporierits 
problem representation, the outcorrie of the decisiori rriakirtg process and, very importantly, 
the pattern of bargaini~~g behavior of the opponent. At ally point in tirne, the actual 
bargaining behavior is a coniplex function of these variables arid ally one of them niay be 
overridden by the other, particularly the lower order variables (that do riot show a 
hierarchical influence reiationsllip over this process in Figure 1). 
* Outcome - State-of-the-problem: This represents the offers artd concessions of the 
bargaining entities and shows the state of the problem resolution effort at any point in 
time. When agreement has been reached between the offers of the bargaining entities, it 
represents the culmination of the negotiation process. In the stages prior to  agreement, it 
serves as a referrent state for the revision of expectations and perceptions by each 
bargainer, and as a vehicle of change for the environment at each stage of the 
negotiation process. 
Figure 2 gives two illustrations of the model. The first exarnple uses the model to describe 
negotiations among management and labor in a manufacturing firm that is trying to cut personnel 
costs due to severe financial problems. The second example describes negotiations among the 
marketing and engineering departments of a car nla~lufacturer working with different goals on the 
design of a new car for the 1990's. This example is based on a real application studied in the 
MEDIATOR project but, as the first one, is highly simplified for purposes of exposition. 
O t r r  rrlotlel 1 1  I- -01t(_111r ro ~ ~ l t e ~ / r a i e  t tl  co~~iplext t~es ot the negotint~on process into a simple 
,.ierives its sirei:;'i;i i r i : ~ ~ ~  rLc.\ 1,~ctor.r :  first. i t s  iiiiiiity to  accorrroclate ,z global perspective of tile 
Ciiilipt.si~elit- i.iili j x ,  L I(.!? i i i r i  - r ( . o ~ l i i ,  it; e1!ipit*!-i2 O I L  the  clyiiairlic rlntiire of such a process. Ttir 
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1 Example 1. The Union-Management negotiation 1 Example 2. Interdepartmental Negotiation 1 
I I I I I 
I Union Representative I Management Rep. I Engineering Department I Marketing Department i 
................................................................................................................................................ 
Environment I * General recession I * Severe financial loss I * advances in fuel-efficient I * Competitors have announced I 
I - rising unemployment/costs I I engines. 1 the "car of the century" 1 
I I I * projected shortage in steel 1 * projected growth in the 1 
I I 1 supply 5 years from now. I market for luxury sedans ? 
............................................................................................................................................... I 
Experience 1 * Past experience of union/management in negotiating I * Exp. with mktg. in last proj. 1 * Engg -"they are unimaginative 
I with each other. 1 - they want the impossible! ! I and lazyw I 
I * Settlements reached by 1 * Strategies used by I * That Mktg.Mgr cares only 1 * Last time had to invoke the 1 
I other unions in same circs 1 other companies 1 about his image. 1 director's authority.. 1 
............................................................................................................................................... I 
Negotiator needs I * Minimize retrenchment & 1 * Cut costs to an acc. 1 * Must keep down: workload on I * Must beat competitors product I 
and values I losses to constituents 1 level and save company I body shop, minimize retooling, I * Inc. market share by -30% 1 
1 * Constituents must recogn 1 * Use the Oppurtunity to I and redeployment/retraining. i I 
I -ize my efforts - must keep t reinforce position of I * Must show that Kktg.Mgr that I * I have got to look good - I ! 
1 face. / strength. I he cannot shove me around. I must make it to the VP's post I 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------&-------------------------------------- I 
Perceptions and I * Possible alternatives- I * There may be other I * Design should have very good I * Design should have lots of ? 
Expectations I take pay cut ,agree to phased 1 choices. The union will I fuel economy. Other things are I new/extra features. Styling musL I 
I lay-off, or bargain for @in 1 come up with something I not too important. Marketing I be improved. Engg. will possibly1 
I retrenchment. Mgmt will be I Will accept anything I will propose total change - too I resist any change on grounds of 1 
I tough but reasonable. Will I reasonable. I costly. I cost. 1 
I reciprocate. Must ensure minl I I * We must show that we can earn I 
/ retrenchment. I I I more throg better pricing. 1 
............................................................................................................................................... I 
Decision-making I * Maximizing approach -must I * A target reduction in I * Minimize tooling expenses, 1 * Maximize saleable features 1 
process I minimize losses to constit I costs. Will accept any I R&D investment reqd., and steel I May accept compromise on some 1 
I -uents, yet be 1 proposal that satisfies I consumption. I I 
............................................................................................................................................... i 
Bargaining I* Begins stridently opposing I * Proposes drastic retr I * Start - propose just a new I * Start with "dream car" - often/ 
behavior I -concede mild pay cut,limit I -enchment, marginal conc 1 engine - make alt. proposals/ I complain that Engg is unreason 1 
I -ed lay-off, and so on. I -essions. Threatens shut-l concessions - at times refuses 1 -able - threaten to again go to 1 
1 1 down when union flunreaso I to take responsibility for I the director - make concessions 1 
1 I -nableft. New proposals.. I the project. I I 
------_-----__C---_------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------d--------- I 
Outcome / * Position of union/mgmt totally at odds. Concessions 1 * Start with seeming total disagreement. Concessions/new proposals/ 
"state-of-the- 1 bring them closer. New proposals change focus. I bring them closer to an agreement. Changes in environment force I 
problem" I Finally reach agreement. I constant revisions till the product is finally on the road.. I 
............................................................................................................................................... I 
FIGURE 2. T W O  REAL-LIFE EXAMPLES IN TERMS OF OUR 
major drawback to  this niodel is tha t  we do not yet have empirical evidence to support tlie choice 
of coniponents a n d  irlteractions directly. However, some validity is given to  the model by studying 
its relationship t o  the reference displines -- see the following subsection. Inasrnucl~ as our goal is not 
to develop new negotiation tecliniques, but  to support existing and forthcoming ones by 
computer/cox~iniui~icatiori technology, this degree of validity niay be sufficient. In order to provide 
realistic negotiation support, the two-person model is easily adapted to  other typical decision 
settings: 
* Full cooperation: There is no  necessity for individual perception and expectation 
components because a joint problem representation can be used instead. The  bargaining 
behavior is lirr~ited t o  an  exchange of offers; no strategic bargaining occurs. 
* More tllari two parties: Each player's individual negotiation support systern provides the 
same coniponents as in the two-person case. The  only extensions needed are in the 
perrept~ons and expectations co~rlporient where each indivicfual h a s  n ~ e p e r n t e  
represeritation for his perceptions arid expectatio~is of each of the other parties ns well s s  
his own. While in principle this may lead to complex inforniation structures. these are 
siniplified as it is often assumed that  11-person bargaining dituatioris can be considerecl as 
a two-party situatioris because of coalition forrilation. 
* T h i r d  party intervention in the  forni of a rriediator or  arbitrator: The 
mediatorjarbitrator can be considered a third player in the ganie bu t  wi th  no personal 
interest or motivation except to help both parties reach an  agreement. 
3.2. Relationship to the other Models 
In an  attempt to  justify the proposed model. this subsection interprets tlie approaches described in 
section 2 as special cases of the unified niodel which emphasize the s tudy of particular components 
and make simplifying assumptions about the others. 
* Game Theory: This subset of the  model focuses on some aspects of the Bargaining 
Behavior and some aspects of the Perceptions and Expectations coniporlent (particularly in 
games with unknown opponerlt utility functions). It assumes away the Dec~sion-Making 
Process as being rational utility maximizing and assumes that  the needs/values of the  
negotiator do not change. There is little consideration of the effect of former experience 
(through stereotypes) or  the dynamics of the  environment (except t ime costs). Dyrianlic 
gnnie theory does consider the feedback from the cliarrqinc state-of-the-problenl 
" Decisiorl Making Tinder Uncertainty: f t e r ~ .  i ;it. ittnirl ioc-its i s   it Decision- It,ikiiiu, 
-. F'rni.i;?s. . I  1 1 1 1  i'+xr.ct,i;riot~s :irlcl Expec:r atiijiis, 1 1 t i 1 il;n iiiltii: i-;rlvirr t i i i i i ( - c : i  : i i  
,?iter~rig t i l t  prrcr?prior~a niid expectstiorls na well .IS rile .i:>:ti,.,l:riati.~~e;is lit i l l+. .ie:i-i~i!- 
i l ~ a k i i ~ c  lir.,i.c.s> - , i .  ~lecisio~i t1eurist.i~ are also c.c~nsidcriii!. i ' e r tn i r~  .<tniiclnrd Ne:>.!- lF tii:t , .-  
{risk ; > i . . . : - - i , ~ i i ~  f.iii!les.; nr ecjuit?;. rnixecl-rnot,ives] a re  irlcl~~c!eii wilile titilers ,ire igiiorezi 
, . The r t i  i!:i - r i t ~ i * .  of  tlii:, kinii cif rriodel is the i r ~ t e r p i ~ ~ !  hetuiret-t pe r c i l p t i o~~  as  :li'ior:r+l i--? 
( . O ~ I ~ I ~ . I V ~  LIII!: lri#.l!ts. !:~~rii~i~iecl ratior~ality etc.? ZLIICI Jecisio~i l i e ~ ~ r i s t i c s  1)inses. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-86-30 
* Joint Decision Making: This approach corlcentrates on the components of State-of-the- 
probleni a n d  the interaction between Bargaining Behaviors. It takes cognizance of the 
important changes in Perception that occur during the course of bargaining, as well as 
the effect of cognitive limitations but other Perceptio~ls as being consta~lt .  The Decision- 
Making Process,, for instance. is perceived as useful only to determine the intial position 
from which bargaining may commence. The theories look at  negotiations as a process of 
search through the problems space to find a solution. 
* Sociological Approach: This theory assumes that the Decision-Making Process is one of 
own utility maximization subject to a need for fairness. The Perception of 
fairnesslunfairness of the opponents' bargai~iirig behavior shows concern for the feedback 
process that changes Perceptions and Expectations and so determines Bargaining Behavior. 
Little consideration is given to effects of Experience or the Environment (except social 
norrns which can be thought of as groap needs/values). 
* Industrial Relations: Here the focus is almost exclusively on the Perceptions and 
Expectations coniponent as the main driving force behind conflict. Group needs/values are 
thougllt to rionlirrate the rieqotiator values and shape Expectations and Perceptions of the  
Erivirorirrierlt - the iriterdeperidence arlcl the chance of interference as well as beliefs about 
power distribution, control ecc. The dynamic nature of Perceptio~is and Expectations is 
viewed as a function of feedback from the state-of-the-problem, bargaining behavior of 
opponent and changes 111 the euviroilrneilt and consequent changes 111 group ~ ~ e e d s ~ v a l u e s .  
The role of the ~ndividual needs/values of the bargainer and of the decision-making 
process are largely ignorect. 
* Psychology: This approach analyses the interplay between the different subcomponents of 
the negotiator's needs/values and their effect on the Bargaining Behavior. To a limited 
extent, psychology also studies the Perceptions and Expectations conlponent as it can be 
affected by Bargaining Behavior. It does consider the effect of the Environment in 
triggering certain needs and fixing certain values. 
We have attempted to show how the different approaches can be visualizecl as subsets of our 
model. In doing this we have concentrated on the main thrust of assumptions and research approach 
in each field. Some of the more intricate and involved pieces of research in some fields had to be 
omitted, but can be fitted into the model as well. 
4. DESIGN OF AN INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATION SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT 
Our primary ohjectlve 111 studying the different approactres to understanding negotiatiorrs and 
developing a itnifleci ~ilodel was to develop a frarriework that would be capable oi tac~iltatlrlg tile 
dbsesjnlelrt ot i ~ e q * i t l ~ i t l ~ i ~  -1t1inciu1~- f1011i rile L I + X ~ ) # , L I I ~  ~t i i ~ c l i ~ ~ ~ l i i a l  l e(~-~tsli I I I I L ~ J I -  l i t  9 
i l l~i l~ipet io~l  <ie~i-ii?ii -iippslit - \-re:~i -rrt i i i t :  E-ioi- * I ~ I I L A  - a )  w e  - ~ i i ~ i ~ i ~ ~ t ~ z e  r i l e  g l , ~ h a i  111111ripe1-t~~i 
D>i: nrcititectriie (L1EL)IIr:'0II] 111 ~ l ~ l c h  riie i i i ~ i ~ \ ~ < ! l l i l  ile,iiiiiaTir>tl -1ipporr rnviic>rlirie~~t 1- ti? ire 
e~ribericied 
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4.1. MEDIATOR Overview 
Based on experience with a GDSS for cooperative nlultiple criteria group decision making called 
CO-OP [Bui and Jarke 1984; Bui, 19851, the MEDIATOR project at New York University attempts 
to develop a comprehensive multiperson decision support system which also addresses issues of non- 
cooperation. Work on MEDIATOR thus far has focused on aspects of decision maker interaction and 
system structure rather than individual negotiation support [Jarke et al., 1986], and on case studies 
in interdepartmental rlegotiation support jGiordano et al., 19853. 
From a system perspecttve, MEDIATOR can be understood as a specialized nlultiuser niicro- 
mainframe database management, system as depicted in Figure 3. Decision rnakers or players employ 
private data and tools on individual workstations -- and data from shared corporate or external 
databases -- to corrie up with an individual problem represeritation they are willirig to share with a 
human group leader or mediator (though possibly not with other negotiating parties). -4 section of 
the global database contains a group joint problern represent ation synthesized by the mediator from 
individual problem representations using specialized private data and tools. The group joint problem 
representation is visible to all members of the group but not outside the group. Database transactioii 
concepts similar to those used in CAD/CAM databases are being developed to enforce these r~iles. 
The use of database concepts carries over partially to the problem representatzon perspectzve. 
Relational decision matrix structures generated by i~lteractive multiple criteria decision methods 
[Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun, 19841 are employed for the individual and group joint problem 
representations. Extended view definition facilities coupling model bases and databases are used for 
the creation of individual problern representations, and view integration techniques from database 
design are employed for synthesizing group joint problem representations [Jarke et al., 19861. 
Finally, there is a process perspectzve. Expanding on an idea by Shakun (1981), negotiation is 
viewed as a process of cooperatwe evolutionary systern design where the "system" 1s the group joint 
problem representation and the design goal is to reach a representation in which at least one 
decision alternative is acceptable to all players. In contrast to traditional system design. the problerrl 
1s represented ns a tirrie-vary~ng rnapplnq froin control space (the dec~s~on  alternatives) to cilteria 
;pate (the c~lteria ilscti i,r, any of  the dect~iori irlakers) to utility space (the preference -trurrlue ok 
Z L C ~  ifer 1 - 1  1 )  i l l  { / l i  1 \ li ' i l i t  r r i i r i  11 ,i- \n : i l i i e l  ltii,ii itid inregintioil - r i p -  Y.\II, ii * i ~ t . % ~  \ t  8 
nclller,e nn ~ r l i t i n i  > r i i i l r l  11 rr1:lriii  slug: r r l ~ l  ' Jac ic j i  ) i i r i ~ t  k~~cirnilt?(ige, the ril?in tool? f o i  ~ ~ ~ l s i r i ~  the 
g1o11p jo~rit p~oble~i l  1epic-e1~r1ri,11i I I P  t i i o - f  ~ O I  r y r  11 - - r ~ h ? n g  t h i c ~ i ~ l l  p~t ) t , i~n l  ~ ( a ~ i e r i : ~ ~ t ~ ( s ~ ~  111 
ni l )  of the r h r e ~  -1i1~- i t  2 a :  f i i - i t r t  r I i t c i r n  ~ i r - i i i c , i  - i i q  1 1 i t j  l i b :  
IT'; r 7ri7 - P  tlllotl;h ri'iiie--ii)ii-;l, 1/\&11v i i i  i i j ) ~ l l !  i i i r  $ 1  t L Y I O I ~ : ' L ~ I C  < iiiie-flrcta~et~< 21il1tl I I I L P ~ ~ C > C ! \  
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F I G U R E 3 :  MEDIATOR Design -- Communication through Data Sharing 
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4.2. I n d i v i d u a l  N e g o t i a t i o n  Support E n v i r o n m e n t  
In the context of MEDIATOR, the individual negotiation support erlvironment conlprises a major 
part  of the "private da ta  and tools" offered to  each player in his or  her local workstation. It 
should enable a negotiator to consciously analyze his own and his opponents' behavior, and  to  
articulate and exanline the underlying motivations, assumptions, attitudes and strategies (cf. also 
[Henderson, 19863). Such an analysis, though perliaps infeasible in the midst of a heated negotiation, 
would serve a very useful purpose as a preparatory exercise before a negotiation, as a tool for 
analysis during protracted negotiations, for post-negotiation review, and possibly for training and 
refining negotiation techniques. 
However, the internal mechanics of the components of the  unified model and their irlteractions are 
too complex, dyrlaniic and numerous for a hurrlan to keep track of. T o  overconre tliis lirtl~tatioxi, 
knowledge-based systems could be envisiorled as "cognitive aids" to  the process. T h a t ,  in a nutshell, 
is what the individual negotiation support systern attenlpts to be. The cog~litive process in the  
context of a negotiation can be structured in terms of the unified model, and instantiated with 
insights and specific methods tha t  the different approaches supply. The structure of a system built 
around the unified niodel is proposed in Figure 4. The main coniponents of this systern, as well as 
their relationship to each other and to the unified model can be describecl as follows. 
* The k n o w l e d g e  b a s e  manages relatively stable iilforniation in three areas. Ps ychologzcal 
models take the form of psychological profiles and rules about the  possible characteristic 
needs/values, attitudes, patterns of possible behavior. etc. Hzstory of experzence3 wzth 
speczfzc opponents contains a selective record of previous behavior toward and by 
opponents and all tha t  is known about them. The general experzence bank accumulates 
knowledge of possible negotiation scenarios, typical strategies in such scenarios etc. 
* The m o d e l  b a s e  rrlanages a variety of decision-making models and heuristics tha t  might 
be used by decision makers based upon personal predisposition, perceptions and 
expectations, or perceived state-of-the-problem (see [Bui, 19851 for a description of a 
"content-orierltecl nloctel bank" ill GDSS which corltains a subset of the rrlodels neeclecl for 
this component). 
* In contrast t,o the knowledge base which provides general and relatively teniporally stable 
nlemory aids. tile b l a c k b o a r d  cn.ptlrres inforrriatiori about the evolvirlq s ta te  of a 
particular negotintiori probleni. The  .L. sil .- .  '~:ctiue,i blackhoard conta i~ls  t>he verbalized own 
rieeds/vaines nricl perceiveti iiet~tls v:sitres o f  rile opporierit as ~rtocierated bv t,lie ktlowledge 
base. 'Cfl r  i;er,,ijj i : ,  ,rn : ;ts\i. .>- r!~t, i;i.rhnlizc.il ;>ercept,ioris , i f  nwrl 8 ~ ~ l * i  O ~ ~ , ) : ~ P I I ~ , ' F  
. .. . . 
"probleili represenrnti'jri -- 1 1 j e s .  i s  e 1 i 1  !lrrrr~atives 
available, preferences. :oiisr rili21 i s .  , . ~ i z ~ i l l i r  ! I I I ~ I I C ~ .  etc. irtotlerai eil I;y r 11r pert r,ivet.i rieecis 
artd the kriowleclqe preserkt iii tile krl~i.itIelrr base ;ihoiit the <ipporienr nnil  t l l - i t  rei,.v;~rit rt2 
his perceived psyct~oiiiqicai profile F ' i i~~tl ly.  tile e x ~ e ~ : i ~ i i ! ~ - n , :  Lbaci-i . i i , r i  i.ijitt.liiis t l ~ e  
expectations aboitt the 0pp0Jlrllt '~ ;i~l~?iii!e ;tctiij~is :iiirl iilteil~i~)lls as iilociernteci i>;v. the 
perceptions b1ackbc;nrd corlteiit nlr(l I 11. irii'oi.i~i;ri t j i !  r~v:~iIi~llir: Lit t tie kiiou Jetiqe i-i;l$e ah<,i~t  
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the opponent's past behavior and that of others in similar situations. Each of these 
subcomponent blackboards consists of two (and more if there are niore than one 
opponent) parts that have to communicate and cross-check each other for internal 
consistency. They are all constantly under revision by the users perceptions of the 
bargaining behavior of the opponent and by changes in the environment in addition to 
the moderation mentioned above. This concept is similar to actor formalisms as proposed 
by Hewitt (1976). 
* The belief maintenance module is responsible for the niaintenance of internal 
consistency in the decision maker's belief system (cf. [Doyle, 19793). It keeps track of the 
changing perceptions (which can be thought of as assumptions), state-of-the-world, 
environmental factors and available knowledge (psychological models, past experiences with 
opponent, general experiences). In accordance with these, it revises the perceived 
needs/values, the perceptions of own and opponent's problem representation, and the 
expectations. 
* Finally, the dialog m o d u l e  of the individual DSS has to be enhanced to guide the user 
througliout the rieqotiation process. This involves eliciting itrforiilatiori curlceririlrq iiis 
perceptions of opponents' and owri needs, proble~rl repesentatioils and expectations. I t  
also includes blackboard manipulation, wholistic problem understanding, and at,t,ention 
focusing. The dialog iriodule lets the user access data  and model managenlent facilities 
[Elam et al., 19801 to select decision-making rnodels, t,o generate possible act,ions, ancl t,o 
present reports of expectations, choice of action, and sunlniaries of historical records of 
strategies used in similar situations. 
Space restrictions prevent a deeper discussion of this architecture arid niany details are yet to  be 
worked out. Nevertheless, it seems a feasible though ambitious approach which irnplerrients the 
unified model and relies on components operational in existing A1 systems. Moreover, a conlparison 
of Figures 1 and 3 demonstrates a good fit between the global MEDIATOR architecture and its 
subjective mirror image in each individual negotiation support environment. This correspondence was 
further highlighted in a recent experiment by Defour and Shakun (unpublished) that employed 
MEDIATOR for siniulating a real hostage negotiation case, in order to study the usefulness of the 
niultiperson model for individual negotiation support (in this case: support for the negotiator who 
attempts to get the hostages released) 
A number of negotiation support, tools reported in the literature could be erxlbedded into such an 
environment. Many of t hew tools come frnrrl the dornnins of game ttrenrv ~ n d  rntrltiple crlteria 
decision making, posslblv ~orribirred with cori~ideratiorls oi urrcertaillt.~ ( e  lr . HLII, 1985. Kersten. 
1985; Shdku~i. 1085 ) ( ~ i t ~ : ~ ~ e i - i ~ l l i  I \  1 1 1  i ~ ~ l ~ ~  - \  - i c l I l  \ i?iet1f2t*~ - i'l8 1 , 111.11- r I - - I - ~  t 1 1 ~  
trainirlg of riegotiatora by ileipi~ty t!ierli i i . t ic t i / \~ te  , i r l i l  therefore clearly iiiiiiri.;t i i i t l  ilieii. pc.rczptic,ria 
of the prohie111 froni blieir owrr ail{! r l~ei i  opponrnr's viellipoi'lts. iV!:ile tilis is 1iI-i ,, 51it.fniii1q :onl 
w ~ t h  rlo prescriptive suppport, arrotlier c c ~ r l r r i l - i c  la1 p n r k n z r  j \eqc;tinrlijil Eii jc t!ilIll i l l  E'iqi-' L I I C  ) 
asks its user n str~lctured set of quesrioi~s froin which  ncSviCce on n nrqotintion strategy is inferred. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-86-30 
Unfortunately, no  support is given for adapting this strategy to the course of the negotiation 
process, and t h e  large number of questions to be answered prevents frequent repetition of system 
usage during the  negotiation. Undoubtedly, more tools will appear in the future. 
5 .  CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this paper should have denionstrated one negative and one positive result. On 
the one hand, the  multitude of representations proposed by the different areas appears to  make it 
presently impossible to conie up with a co~rlpreherisive group negotiation support system that 
"objectively" covers all aspects of a negotiation situation in a fashion acceptable to all group 
members. Machine com~nunication among group nlenibers will therefore have to be limited to 
relatively simple, nlutually understandable representations. 
On the other hancl, the unified model proposed i11 this paper sho111cl make it possible for 
zncLTzvzdual decision makers to articulate and enhance their personal understandirig of tlle negotiation 
position, by structuri~ig their thinking in a much richer framework, using tools fro111 the various 
areas. Coherence among these tools is then provided partially by the unified rnodel which describes 
the interactions anlorig different descriptive arid prescriptive tecliniclues in teritls of the rriodel 
components and relatioriships concerned, and partially by the decision maker himself, wing the 
blackboard and knowledge base components of the proposed system as cognitive aids. 
This argument carries over to a human mediator or group leader, perceived as a particular case of 
an individual decision maker. It leads us to believe that the MEDIATOR architecture -- which does 
include such a human mediator -- should be able to provide more powerful group decision support 
than a fully autonlatic GDSS approach, especially when geographical dispersion limits direct 
communication among decision makers outside the system. 
Besides raising a host of ~rlterestiri~ design arid evalnatiori questions, the proposed i~idividual 
negotiation support environn~ent and its integration into tlle MEDIATOR framework leads to 
another important observation Since the individual niodel (even the part of it that is represented in 
tlie system) is so rrluch riciier tharr tlie "group joirit pr uble~ll I epreserrtntloli ' , the ' iildlvldual 
problern representatioii" cornporlent 111 ?IIEDI.ATOR (Flgrtre ;) --.~tl:ose iole I: to cornpress the 
'01 l i e  px ohierrt lepte-eirtation"-- i\:!l i l r l l  ,it i!li,:x 1 1 1  l t a l ~  1' ' 1 - I , ( !  I : - i t 8 i t i  i r i  ) f  liifolii~,rtluil 
O T ; . I ~  11: i? ~oopernt l te  >ettlllq Researc!~ 111 tile treatrnritr )I i r : c c  ! r l p i * t r  ) I  lir-tnitecl i n f o r n ~ n t ~ o ~ ~  nlll 
tlierc>for t pin\ n CI ucial role tor tile Liiccess o t  i ~ i i i i t i p t ' r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  i ) b N  
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